Allocating too much UNI to this program is not so much the bottleneck—it’s more so the number of qualified candidates. Even if we have a 10M UNI pool spread out across 10 new delegates, I struggle to list 10 new parties that should qualify for more delegation just in the governance camp. Yes, more delegates have begun participating in governance since you can monetize gov participation. But I feel uneasy prioritizing new delegates who recently got involved in governance over alternative contributors. Since the pool of long-term, active delegates with lackluster voting power is relatively small at the moment, I think a larger portion of the total pool should actually go to devs, researchers, grantees, etc. Maybe a 60-40 split of the 10M is warranted.
Expiration makes things tricky. Too much VP from the treasury could just lead to collusion and permanence of existing delegates, so perpetual delegation is a valid concern. But this may make more sense to explore when the amount of voting power is a certain degree above the quorum, that way, even if we lose some delegates due to simultaneous expiration, proposals are still able to pass (ideally expiration is staggered…but this adds subjectivity as to how long delegation terms last for different delegates). That’s why it’s important for the community to elect parties that have a strong reputation in the community from the get-go, and as mentioned above, there are not enough of those simply on the governance side.
All of the candidates from the previous delegate race also have high voting participation rate and do a good job of communicating their rationales. So determining who loses delegation, or if it’s a ubiquitous removal of voting power, will be key. It may be easier to frame treasury delegation as a “seat” that you are voted into for x duration of time, rather than something you hold in perpetuity unless you become an adversarial actor. And after the delegate’s tenure is up, they are up for re-election against a pool of other candidates.
^I’d much rather allocate resources to delegates and other contributors that have clearly partook in the growth and development of the protocol as opposed to regulators. This is a gray area that I don’t think we are in a position to address today. Plus, there’s no explicit indication of interest on this front, partly due to liabilities that regulators may incur from partaking in governance. Note—I do not have expertise in this area…so this is just my hunch.
True, but that’s why the DAO spent $10M on the DEF this year. So, it’s not like the DAO has not considered its impact in the political space. If a an individual who happens to be privy to the political sphere wants to partake in the DAO, I think we’d welcome them. And once they demonstrate good participation, they can perhaps get voting power.