We agree that lowering the quorum is not a viable solution. Maintaining a higher quorum threshold ensures greater security for the DAO, a critical consideration for DAOs with substantial treasuries, such as Uniswap.
Regarding treasury delegation, we share other delegates’ perspectives that it might not be the optimal long-term strategy. However, longer-term solutions naturally require extended periods to develop and implement. In the meantime, we see this program as an effective interim measure until more sustainable and robust initiatives become feasible—such as the full deployment of Unistaker, increased token-holder re-engagement following the DUNA initiative, and improvements in the regulatory landscape.
To ensure effectiveness in the interim, it is crucial to incorporate objective metrics for evaluating applicants.
We concur with this assessment, particularly in a purely electoral context lacking objective criteria. Delegates with significant voting power and established reputations are likely to dominate purely political or brand-driven elections. While many of these delegates indeed merit such delegation, incorporating objective evaluation metrics would better support delegates who demonstrably contribute meaningful value to the DAO.
Ultimately, for this specific program, we advocate prioritizing delegates who provide tangible value to the DAO over those relying solely on established brands, though these attributes need not be mutually exclusive.