# \[RFC\] Treasury Delegation Round 2 **URL:** https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-treasury-delegation-round-2/25355 **Category:** Requests for Comment **Created:** [March 11, 2025, 3:33am UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-treasury-delegation-round-2/25355 "2025-03-11T03:33:39Z") **Posts on this page:** 1 **Showing post:** 10
### Author: ![jengajojo](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/gov.uniswap.org/jengajojo/32/8661_2.png) [@jengajojo](https://gov.uniswap.org/u/jengajojo) #### Post date: [March 12, 2025, 2:38pm UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-treasury-delegation-round-2/25355/10 "2025-03-12T14:38:14Z")
Thanks for the work put in to create this proposal @Tane. I agree with your approach of splitting the delegation into two cohorts. I strongly support having an objective metrics based criteria in order to avoid the gameability associated with elections. However, having a cutoff and equal delegation does not seem fair to the delegates who have scored non-zero points as well as to the delegates who scored higher than others. The proposal metric is an interesting challange, since delegates can form a ‘cabal’ of sorts and put each others’ names in the proposal as authors. Then these same delegates can propose an incentive campaign based on metrics such as proposal writing to qualify themselves for such a campaign. We have seen this behaviour in the recent incentives cycle. On the other hand we do want delegates to come up with interesting proposals that move the DAO forward. A good solution would be to **proportionally allocate to all delegates who participate** (and can prove they are not sybills). I.e. create a objective criteria which includes points for proposal writing as well as other stated metrics and proportionally allocate to all delegates based on their score, only excluding those who are proven sybills or have demonstrated other behaviours which conflict with Code of Conduct of the DAO. --- _[View the full topic](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-treasury-delegation-round-2/25355)._