# \[RFC\] Governance Logistics Improvements **URL:** \ **Category:** Requests for Comment\ **Created:** [July 21, 2025, 7:24pm UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-governance-logistics-improvements/25737 "2025-07-21T19:24:47Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 1\ **Showing post:** 19
**Author:** ![SEEDGov](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/gov.uniswap.org/seedgov/32/8912_2.png) [@SEEDGov](https://gov.uniswap.org/u/SEEDGov)\ **Post date:** [August 28, 2025, 6:46pm UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-governance-logistics-improvements/25737/19 "2025-08-28T18:46:58Z")
Thank you for structuring the two proposals! We have separate feedback and comments for each of them: > [@DonOfDAOs](#): > > Proposal Summary (Treasury Delegations): In principle, we agree with this proposal, as we have repeatedly and in differetn postrs expressed our support for it. While we acknowledge that it may not be the ideal or definitive solution, we believe it is necessary given the current challenges the DAO faces in consistently reaching quorum for on-chain proposals. That said, we have two suggestions to improve the proposal: - **Cap per delegate.** In addition to maintaining the 2.5M VP total cap (coming from the treasury or otherwise), we suggest that no delegate should receive more than 1M or 1.5M UNI through this program. This means that regardless of the VP each delegate already holds, no single delegate would be allocated more than this threshold, with the overall cap of 2.5M UNI per delegate remaining in place. This adjustment would ensure that treasury delegation is distributed more horizontally across more delegates, reducing the risk that only 4 or 5 delegates capture the entire 10M UNI delegation pool. - **Selection method.** We do not agree that delegates should be chosen by DAO voting. [As we have pointed out on previous occasions](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-treasury-delegation-round-2/25355/35), such a process risks becoming a popularity contest or incentivizing cartelization or collusion among delegates. This would contradict good governance practices and directly contravene the [Uniswap DAO Principles](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/proposal/78) (“_Delegates must prevent the formation of cartels and ensure that the protocol is protected from any proposals driven by personal motives that do not align with the protocol’s best interests_”). Instead, we believe that the ranking and selection among applying delegates should follow the same scoring methodology as the [rewards program](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-delegate-reward-initiative-cycle-4/25764), which accounts for participation rates. This is a more objective and reliable way to prioritize delegates based on their actual engagement in the DAO and avoid the risk of assigning VP to popular delegates with low participation, which would conspire against the proposal’s goal of increasing the voting VP. * * * * * * * * * > [@EventHorizon](#): > > Proposal Summary (Incentivized Delegation Vaults): We have previously stated [our opposition to this proposal](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-governance-logistics-improvements/25737/5#p-57377-ii-incentivized-delegation-vaults-idvs-increase-votable-supplyhttpsgovuniswaporgtrfc-governance-logistics-improvements25737p-57366-ii-incentivized-delegation-vaults-idvs-increase-votable-supply-6-2), and in addition to the reasons already provided, we would like to add further concerns based on the details now available: - **Overlap with UVN - Trial Program.** Unichain will soon launch [UVN](https://uniswapfoundation.mirror.xyz/CdxJ2f5oTC5cWDGhOCM6z5ikcHCyrSrAzKc0QQihogI), which aims to attract and incentivize UNI tokenholders to become stakers and validators of the network. We believe this IDV system would directly compete with the official staking mechanism since both aim to attract UNI. When [we raised this point](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-governance-logistics-improvements/25737/5), @donofdaos [responded](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-governance-logistics-improvements/25737/7) that Unichain’s launch may take time and, if this initiative proved redundant, the IDV could be deprecated once UVN is live: - **Potential Conflict of Interest.** In reviewing this proposal, we want to raise a concern regarding the dual role of @donofdaos as both a member of the Uniswap Accountability Committee (UAC) and the [founder](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uac-season-4-application/25580/4) of @eventhorizon, the entity proposed to develop and maintain the IDV. As described, the UAC would not only monitor implementation and evaluate deliverables, but also oversee the disbursement of funds related to this proposal. Given @donofdaos’s connection to @eventhorizon, this could place him in the challenging position of being both service provider and evaluator of the same work — for instance, participating in decisions on milestones, APR adjustments, or payment releases to the company he founded. We believe this situation raises important questions for the DAO: The [Uniswap DAO Principles](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/proposal/78) note that “_Severe conflicts of interest that could undermine the integrity of governance must be avoided._” and that “_delegates should err on the side of transparency and openness_.” In light of this, we respectfully suggest that the DAO consider whether additional safeguards (such as recusal from budget administration or milestone evaluation) would be appropriate if this proposal moves forward. Our intention is not to question the good faith of any individual, but to ensure that Uniswap governance upholds the highest standards of impartiality, transparency, and accountability. --- _[View the full topic](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-governance-logistics-improvements/25737)._