In addition to Blockworks’ commentary on usage, I would like to raise a concern regarding the type of volume being attracted to the Uniswap V3 deployment on Celo:
A significant portion of the volume appears to come from just a few addresses engaging in arbitrage trading or potentially wash trading against users or pairs.
- 0xcD7b506FF136b4b1652f3ceea41ddc01cd238c2e
- 0x3A414529Cb708497484D75168253961d7e688184
- 0x823E64CEBc1E26ce980afC572c8A6FbbF889429A
- 0x5Cee285eA48c15E4FeA1C928457fA6932F2443d6
- 0xa37300de8F892BC36BdCDb8F4e6D5b0032A4e950
- 0x183107ae63a6a1b035539feeb0634a3144357312
These are just the addresses I’ve identified from the main explorer page for CELO pairs, and there are likely more.
While I generally support incentive packages for new or established chains, this specific case raises concerns that conflict with the values I prioritize in crypto. Unless a compelling rationale is provided to explain this activity beyond what I’ve inferred, I am inclined to vote against this proposal.
[edit]
I feel compelled to point out that this issue could potentially be mitigated or resolved by shifting the focus of incentives. Instead of targeting the easiest pools for arbitrage or wash trading, it would be more effective to allocate incentives to pools with a higher fee setting (such as 0.05%). This adjustment would reduce noise and impose an economic ‘penalty’ on those engaging in such activities, providing a more accurate reflection of the genuine usage of Uniswap V3 on Celo.