# Axia Network Delegate Platform **URL:** \ **Category:** Delegation Pitch\ **Created:** [February 20, 2026, 9:49pm UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/axia-network-delegate-platform/26036 "2026-02-20T21:49:40Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 1\ **Showing post:** 6
**Author:** ![Axia](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/gov.uniswap.org/axia/32/10416_2.png) [@Axia](https://gov.uniswap.org/u/Axia)\ **Post date:** [July 15, 2026, 5:49pm UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/axia-network-delegate-platform/26036/6 "2026-07-15T17:49:01Z")
### **[[Temp Check] Protocol Fee Expansion: Robinhood Chain](https://snapshot.org/#/s:uniswapgovernance.eth/proposal/0xc5fd6e916655b293c903b060906c994ff1ff1df348336b3b3e22ceecd2d13d7c)** **Vote:** FOR **Rationale:** Voted For because this proposal extends the existing protocol fee rollout to Robinhood Chain using a familiar architecture, rather than introducing a new model. Given that Robinhood Chain is an Arbitrum Orbit Chain, the chain’s early volume, and the reuse of the Arbitrum One activation pattern for protocol fee collection, I think this is reasonable. That said, I share some of the concerns raised in the [v4 fee discussion](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/temp-check-activate-v4-protocol-fees/26162). Protocol fees reduce LP income, and if they are applied too aggressively on newer or competitive deployments, they could weaken liquidity depth or push LPs elsewhere. I also think the DAO should keep evaluating whether the fee/burn mechanism creates durable demand for UNI, not just supply reduction. My support is therefore conditional on continued monitoring of LP returns, liquidity depth, volume, competitive positioning, and UNI’s economic role over time. --- _[View the full topic](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/axia-network-delegate-platform/26036)._