March 2025 Voting Update
[Temp Check] Uniswap Unleashed
Vote: Abstain
Type: Snapshot
[Temp Check] Unichain and Uniswap v4 Liquidity Incentives
Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
Combined Rational:
Reflecting on this proposal, we find ourselves holding two key positions: the UF needs to be funded, yet that funding must be met with structured oversight due to potential execution risk. Cutting or drastically reducing UF’s funding doesn’t seem to yield a net-positive outcome, especially given the evolving landscape of Uniswap itself. Uniswap v4 transitions the protocol from a baseline infrastructure into a platform, and Unichain represents an even larger shift as an independent L2. A formal steward is needed to guide these changes. We voted in favor of the incentives proposal with Gauntlet realizing that the adoption of a general purpose L2 and a platform contingent on builders, v4, needs incentives. The landscape is simply too competitive. Gauntlet is a strong choice for the first iteration of the program, but we would prefer working more closely with hooks teams for incentive management in the future. Some RFP structure would be ideal. We will reevaluate this stance come the next tranche of incentives funding. The timelock’s clawback capabilities with the Aera vaults is a good touch.
Beyond Uniswap’s own developments, broader regulatory shifts—most notably, the anticipated adoption of DUNA—could finally unlock direct revenue streams for token holders, marking a pivotal moment where the DAO can engage in more active treasury management. For too long, the DAO has been sidelined, while Labs has been the primary beneficiary of Uniswap’s success. That dynamic is set to change. But the key question remains: with all these moving pieces, can the UF effectively execute its mandates?
This leads to a larger governance challenge: ensuring that UF’s funding is spent in a way that directly benefits the DAO and token holders. The UF, as a 501(c)(4), is legally mandated to prioritize DeFi broadly, not Uniswap specifically. This distinction introduces a risk that some initiatives, such as the proposed $4.5M allocation for CFMs, could end up benefiting the broader DeFi ecosystem without yielding proportional gains for Uniswap. While political engagement is a key advantage of UF’s legal status—evidenced by their efforts in regulatory advocacy—there needs to be a mechanism ensuring that DAO funds are used prudently.
A potential solution is a formalized contract between the DAO and UF, enforcing clear KPIs and accountability measures. However, the DAO currently lacks the legal structure to enter into such agreements. This may change with the implementation of DUNA, but in the interim, alternative safeguards are necessary. One option is electing a dedicated oversight board, composed of industry experts and Uniswap delegates, to ensure strategic alignment. Another is structuring UF’s funding request in multiple tranches, similar to the initial 2022-2023 funding approach, to enable more iterative and disciplined capital allocation. A clawback mechanism could also be introduced, allowing the DAO to reclaim a portion of funds if performance metrics aren’t met.
To those ends, while we are excited to see the prospects surrounding core contributors, incubator programs, etc, we believe that the introduction of v4 and Unichain add too much new surface area for there not to be an interim review at the end of the year. This would make this funding ask contingent on explicit KPIs with clawback capabilities from the DAO. Due to this missing piece, we voted abstain from the funding proposal itself.
Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 3
Vote: For
Type: Onchain
In line with our reasoning from the temp check phase, we decided to vote in favor of this proposal due to the benefit it has provided the DAO in terms of cultivating a stronger and more active set of delegates. It’ll be important to continue monitoring how beneficial the behavior as a result of this program remains and how it can be continually iterated upon.